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Abstract
Commitment devices for savings could benefit those with self-control as well as familial or spousal
control issues.  We find evidence to support both motivations.  We examine the impact of a
commitment savings product in the Philippines on household decision making power and self-
perception of savings behavior, as well as actual savings.  The product leads to more decision
making power in the household for women, and likewise more purchases of female-oriented durable
goods.  We also find that the product leads women who appear time-inconsistent in a baseline survey
to self-report being a disciplined saver in the follow-up survey.  For impact on savings balances, we
find that the 81% increase in savings after one year did not crowd out savings held outside of the
participating bank, but that the longer-term impact over two and a half years on bank savings
dissipated to only a 33% increase, which is no longer statistically significant.  We discuss reasons
why the effect dissipated and the implications for designing and implementing sustainable,
equilibrium-shifting interventions.  
JEL Codes: D12, D63, D91, J16, O12, O16
Keywords: Savings, microfinance, female empowerment, household decision making,
commitment
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I. Introduction 
Commitment devices for savings could benefit those with self-control as well as familial or 
spousal control issues.  The literature on household savings, and on informal savings devices in 
particular, has focused on separating self-control motivations and impacts from spousal or 
familial-control explanations (Anderson and Baland 2002; Gugerty 2006).  A simple reason may 
exist why this task has proven difficult: such devices can serve both purposes.  We examine the 
impact of a commitment savings product in the Philippines on household decision making power 
and self-perception of savings behavior, and indeed find evidence for both. 
 We designed and implemented a commitment savings product with the Green Bank of 
Caraga, a rural bank in the Philippines.  The savings product provided individuals with a 
commitment to restrict access to their savings, thus potentially helping with either self-control or 
family-control issues.  Each individual defined either a “date” goal or an “amount” goal, and was 
then not able to withdraw their funds until the goal was reached.  We reported earlier (Ashraf, 
Karlan and Yin 2006) that after one year individuals who were offered the product increased their 
savings by 81% relative to a control group, and that in accordance with the theoretical literature 
on hyperbolic preferences (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999) and dual-self models 
(Gul and Pesendorfer 2001; 2004; Fudenberg and Levine 2005), time-inconsistent individuals 
were the ones most likely to demonstrate a preference for commitment. 
 We examine three questions: (1) did offering the commitment savings product change the 
household decision making power and self-perception of savings behaviors after one year; (2) did 
the increase in savings crowd out other household savings after one year; and (3) did the impact 
on savings held at the Green Bank sustain itself in the long term, that is, after two and a half 
years?  This paper uses two new sources of data: a follow-up survey conducted on 92% of those 
surveyed in the baseline one year later, and administrative bank data collected after two and a half 
years. 
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 A growing literature on intra-household bargaining finds that exogenous increases in female 
share of income, interpreted as providing the female more power within the household, lead to an 
allocation of resources that better reflect preferences of the woman (Duflo 2003; Rangel 2005).  
This often leads to greater investment in education, housing, and nutrition for children (Thomas 
1990; 1994; 1995; Duflo 2003).  For these reasons and others, many development interventions 
focus on increasing the power of women in the household.1  However, there is little rigorous 
evidence that interventions that focus on power directly (rather than through increasing income) 
actually can promote female empowerment, nor have we assessed the consequences of such 
induced (rather than “naturally” encountered) empowerment.   
 We contribute to this literature by exogenously increasing control of a financial asset.  Some 
current bank clients are randomly chosen to receive an offer to open an additional “commitment” 
account in their own name.  We then examine the impact on both self-reported decision making 
processes within the household and the subsequent household allocation of resources.  The 
commitment savings product caused an increase in household decision making power for married 
women, measured both in the women’s own reporting of how household decisions were made 
and in the household’s purchases of goods typically used by women.  Notably, the effect on 
decision making power is strongest for married women who had below-median household 
decision making power prior to the intervention.  The effect is found for three categories of 
decisions: expenditures on personal items, recreational and expensive items and number of 
children.  We also find that households that were offered SEED were more likely to buy durables 
typically used by women within the household.  We find no such effects on household durables 
when a man was offered the SEED commitment savings account. 
 However, we also find an impact on self-perception of savings behavior.  Note that in earlier 
work we found that time-inconsistent women (as measured through time preference questions in a 
                                                 
1 See, for example, (World Bank 2001).  By “female empowerment” we mean increasing the bargaining 
power of the woman within the household, manifested through increased influence in household decisions 
and through household outcomes that greater reflect her preferences. 
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baseline survey) were more likely to open the SEED account than time consistent women.  Here 
we find that for time-inconsistent women, the SEED account made them more likely to perceive 
themselves as a disciplined saver and to report saving available cash rather than spending it.  
Thus, evidence exists to show that the commitment device had an impact on both spousal control 
and (at least the self-perception of) self-control.   
We also examine whether the increase in savings merely crowded out savings held elsewhere.  
The literature on savings over the life-cycle repeatedly points to the limited ability for deferred 
savings programs to increase aggregate savings (Feldstein 1974; 1982; 1996).  However, it is not 
clear that deferred savings interventions should crowd out other savings when time-inconsistency 
or intra-household bargaining issues underpin the demand for illiquid deferred savings.  Indeed, 
commitment savings devices are thought to increase savings for present-biased discounters 
(Laibson 1997).  Benartzi and Thaler (2004) and Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) provide evidence 
for positive savings response to commitment savings devices.  The latter study shows that 
institutional savings increase in response to a randomized offering of a commitment savings 
account.  However, neither study is able to assess whether savings increases are accompanied by 
contemporaneous crowd-out of savings held in physical assets, savings at other formal or 
informal institutions, or accompanied by negative savings as represented by increased debt.  
Similar crowd-out questions remain unanswered in other interventions which increase savings 
held in specific accounts (Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag and Saez 2006). 
 We find that increases in institutional savings resulting from the commitment product 
offering do not crowd out other savings.  We find positive yet insignificant treatment effects on 
savings held in physical assets, in formal savings at other institutions, and in informal savings 
vehicles.  Further, clients randomly assigned to the commitment-treatment group are no more 
likely to have borrowed money in the past year than the control group, nor is their average level 
of debt significantly different than that of the control clients. 
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 Lastly, we find that the one-year impact reported in Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) was not 
sustained after two and a half years.  Savings impact for the treatment clients is still positive, but 
smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.  We posit several reasons for the diminished 
impact of the commitment product.  First, while use of the commitment account was 
heterogeneous in intensity, even for high-use individuals the account was not used repeatedly 
beyond the first year, despite its effectiveness at increasing savings for these clients.  Perhaps the 
account does indeed work but requires a proactive bank to help set the goal and establish the 
account (again) as a mechanism to help achieve that goal.  Similarly, the theory behind the 
preference for commitment suggests that the commitment account may have caused a deviation 
from a low-savings equilibrium; gradually individuals return to the equilibrium they were in 
before. Bernheim, Ray and Yeltekin (1999) describe how a low asset trap can be exacerbated 
through self-control problems, but that self-control can be more easily imposed once a certain 
threshold level of assets is crossed.  If sustained interventions are necessary to help clients reach a 
new equilibrium, this may be an argument for greater proactivity on the bank’s side.  However, 
given that these are small depositors, such proactivity would likely not be profitable for the bank 
and may need to be subsidized, similar to the interventions discussed by (Kremer and Miguel 
2004).  We discuss the implications of this in more detail later.  
 This paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the commitment savings product and 
the experimental design.  Section III presents the empirical results on household decision making 
and self-perception of savings behavior.  Section IV presents the empirical results on crowd-out 
of other savings.  Section V presents the empirical results for estimating the long-term impact of 
the commitment product on financial institutional savings.  Section VI concludes. 
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II. Intervention and Experimental Design 
The SEED Account 
We designed and implemented a commitment savings product called a SEED (Save, Earn, 
Enjoy Deposits) account with the Green Bank of Caraga, a small rural bank in Mindanao, 
Philippines.  The SEED account requires that clients commit not to withdraw funds that are in the 
account until they reach a goal date or amount but does not explicitly commit the client to deposit 
funds after opening the account.  The SEED accounts are individual accounts, even if the 
participants were married.  There are three critical design features, one regarding withdrawals and 
two regarding deposits.  First, individuals restricted their rights to withdraw funds until they 
reached a specific goal.  Clients could restrict withdrawals until a specified month when large 
expenditures were expected, e.g. the beginning of school, Christmas, a particular celebration, or 
when business needs arose.  Alternatively, clients could set a goal amount and only have access to 
the funds once that goal was reached (e.g., saving a quantity of money known to be needed for a 
new roof).  The clients had complete flexibility to choose which of these restrictions they would 
like on their account. Once the client had made the decision they could neither change it, nor 
could they withdraw from the account until they met their chosen goal amount or date.2 After the 
goal is reached, the SEED client, not his or her spouse, could withdraw the funds.  All clients, 
regardless of the type of restriction they chose, were encouraged to set a specific savings goal as 
the purpose of their SEED savings account.  SEED marketers insisted that the client herself or 
himself, and not another household member, set the goal.3 
                                                 
2Exceptions are allowed for medical emergency, in which case a hospital bill is required, for death in the 
family, requiring a death certificate, or relocating outside the bank’s geographic area, requiring 
documentation from the area government official.  The clients who signed up for the SEED product signed 
a contract with the bank agreeing to these strict requirements.  After six months of the project, no instances 
occurred of someone exercising these options.  For the amount-based goals, the money remains in the 
account until either the goal is reached or the funds withdrawn or the funds are requested under an 
emergency. 
3 SEED marketers reported instances of household visits in which the husband tried to influence the goal-
setting process.  Typically the marketers then asked that only the wife to give her goal and this was 
recorded, but at no point did the marketer make an issue out of the goal setting process.  Green Bank 
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The savings goal was written on the SEED form used to open the account, as well as on a 
“Commitment Savings Certificate” that was given to the client to keep.  Forty-eight percent of 
clients reported wanting to save for a celebration, such as Christmas, birthday or fiesta.4  Twenty-
one percent of clients chose to save for tuition and education expenses, while 20 percent of clients 
chose business and home investments as their specific goals. 
The bank offered each client a locked box (called a “ganansiya” box) for a small fee in order 
to encourage deposits.  This locked box is similar to a piggy bank: it has a small opening to 
deposit money and a lock to prevent the client from opening it.  In our setup, only the bank, and 
not the client, had a key to open the lock.  Thus, in order to make a deposit, clients need to bring 
the box to the bank periodically.  Out of the 202 clients who opened accounts, 167 opted for this 
box.  This feature can be thought of as a mental account with a small, physical barrier; the box is 
a merely a mechanism that provides individuals a way to save their small change.  Individuals put 
loose change or small bills on a daily basis, hence make “deposits” that normally would be too 
small to warrant a trip to the bank.  These small daily “deposits” keep cash out of one’s pocket 
and then eventually, once enough money accumulates in the box, the client deposits the funds at 
the bank.  The barrier, however, is largely psychological; the box is easy to break and hence is a 
weak physical commitment at best.5 
Other than providing a possible commitment savings device, no further benefit accrued to 
individuals with this account.  The interest rate paid on the SEED account was identical to the 
interest paid on a normal savings account (4 percent per annum). 
                                                                                                                                                 
prohibits spouses from being able to withdraw from each others’ accounts, unless the account was 
explicitly opened as a joint account.  No SEED accounts were opened as joint accounts.  
4Fiestas are large local celebrations that happen at different dates during the year for each barangay 
(smallest political unit & defined community, on average containing 1000 individuals) in this region.  
Families are expected to host large parties, with substantial food, when it is their barangay’s fiesta date.  
Families often pay for this annual party through loans from local high-interest-rate money-lenders. 
5 To facilitate deposits, clients also were offered automatic transfers from a primary checking or savings 
account into the SEED account.  This feature was not popular.  Many clients reported not using their 
checking or savings account regularly enough for this option to be meaningful.  Even though preliminary 
focus groups indicated demand for this feature, only 2 out of the 202 clients opted for automated transfers. 
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The Experimental Design and Data Collection 
Our sample for the field experiment consists of 4001 adult Green Bank clients who have 
savings accounts in one of two bank branches in the greater Butuan City area, and who have 
identifiable addresses.  We randomly chose 3154 out of 4001 bank clients to interview for our 
baseline survey.  We then performed a second randomization to assign these individuals to three 
groups: commitment-treatment (T), marketing-treatment (M), and control (C) groups.  One-half 
the sample was randomly assigned to T, and a quarter of the sample each were randomly assigned 
to groups M and C.  We verified at the time of the randomization that the three groups were not 
statistically different in terms of preexisting financial and demographic data.  Of the 3154, 1777 
were located by the survey team and then completed a survey.  See Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 
(2006) for analysis that shows that the treatment and control groups were observably statistically 
similar at the time of the baseline. 
Next, we trained a team of marketers hired by the partnering bank to go to the homes and/or 
businesses of the clients in the commitment-treatment group, to stress the importance of savings 
to them – a process which included eliciting the clients’ motivations for savings and emphasizing 
to the client that even small amounts of saving make a difference – and then to offer them the 
SEED product.  We were concerned, however, that this special (and unusual) face-to-face visit 
might in and of itself inspire higher savings.  To address this concern, we created a second 
treatment, the “marketing” treatment.  We used the same exact script for both the commitment-
treatment group and the marketing-treatment group, up to the point when the client was offered 
the SEED savings account.  For instance, members of both groups were asked to set specific 
savings goals for themselves, write those savings goals into a specific “encouragement” savings 
certificate, and talk with the marketers about how to reach those goals.  However, members of the 
marketing-treatment group were neither offered nor allowed to open the SEED account.  Bank 
staff were trained to refuse SEED accounts to members of the marketing-treatment and control 
groups, and to offer a “lottery” explanation: clients were chosen at random through a lottery for a 
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special trial period of the product, after which time it would be available for all bank clients.  
Green Bank reported that this happened on fewer than ten occurrences.6 
After one year, we conducted a follow-up survey on each of the participants.  The tracking 
rate was high: 92% of those in the baseline were tracked and agreed to a second survey.  Those in 
the treatment group were equally likely to complete a follow-up survey as those in the marketing 
or control group.  This survey contained three sections: (1) inventory of assets, in order to 
measure whether the impact on savings represented a net increase in savings or merely a crowd-
out of other assets; (2) impact on household decision making and savings attitudes; and (3) 
impact on economic decisions, such as purchase of durable goods, health and consumption. 
 
III. Impact on Household Decision Making and Self-Perception of Savings Behavior 
 Household Decision Making Power 
We first examine whether being offered the SEED account changed the decision making roles 
in the household.  In the follow-up survey, we ask questions regarding family planning, financial 
and consumption decisions in order to ascertain the structure of spousal or familial control within 
married households.  For each decision category, we record whether the principle decision-maker 
is the respondent, the spouse, or both. Responses are assigned values of two, zero and one, 
respectively. 
Table 2, Panel A, shows the impact of treatment assignment on household decision making 
for married women.7  The outcome variable is a decision making index calculated as the average 
of responses across nine decision categories.  We find that assignment to the treatment group 
leads to a 0.051 point increase in the decision making index (Table 2 Column 1).  The effect 
                                                 
6In only one instance an individual in the control group opened a SEED account.  This individual is a 
family member of the owners of the bank and hence was erroneously included in the sample frame.  Due to 
the family relationship, the individual was dropped from all analysis. 
7 This applies to married women whose spouses live at home with them.  53 out of 696 married women had 
no spouse in the house in both baseline and follow-up; 24 out of 541 married men had no spouse during 
both surveys. These married individuals were not included in our analysis, as their spouses were not 
sufficiently present in the household to have influence in decision making.  
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suggests that on average one out of twenty women assigned to the treatment group reported an 
increase in their decision making role in one decision category.  The average effect masks 
heterogeneous treatment effects across married women.  Next, we separately analyze the impact 
on women who began the year below (above) the median decision making power.  We find that 
the average effect is entirely driven by increases in decision making ability for women who were 
below the baseline median (comparing columns 2 and 3)—a fact consistent with initially less-
empowered women gaining decision making ability through increased financial savings and 
control over committed assets.  The impact for women below the baseline median is double the 
average effect, indicating that on average one out of 10 married women in the treatment group 
report greater decision making ability in one category.  In contrast, we find no such treatment 
effect for married men (Table 2, Panel B).  
Table 3 reports the impact for married women on household decision making for each of the 
nine decision categories comprising the index used in Table 2.  Panel A shows the results for the 
full sample.  We find impact on two decisions: expensive purchases and number of children.  For 
women below the median in terms of household decision making power (Panel B), we find a 
significant impact of treatment assignment regarding purchases of expensive items, decisions to 
assist family members and purchases of items for personal use.  For women above the baseline 
median (Panel C), the only categories with significant treatment impacts are schooling for 
children and number of children.     
Next, we examine whether the increased reported decision making led to a difference in the 
types of goods purchased for the household.  By increasing the assets available for lumpy 
purchases, the mere presence of the SEED account may increase female decision-making power 
in the household and hence increase the likelihood that the household acquires female-oriented 
durables.  Naturally, if the account is held in the women’s name this effect should be even 
stronger.   
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We use three categories for expenditures: house repair, female-oriented durables (washing 
machines, sewing machines, electric irons, kitchen appliances, air-conditioning units, fans, 
stoves, etc.), and other durables (vehicles, entertainment and recreational goods).  Table 4 finds 
no significant impacts on the choice and/or quantity of durables purchased in the household in 
aggregate, nor broken down by gender.  Table 5 analyzes the same dependent variables, but 
separately for those above and below the median in terms of household decision making power at 
the baseline (similar to Table 3 Panel B and Panel C when analyzing the impact on decision-
making power).  We find that both the number of items purchased and the total expenditures of 
consumer durables traditionally associated with female use in the Philippines increase for married 
women who were below the median in pre-existing bargaining power.  This effect is smaller, and 
not statistically significant, for married women above the median.  This finding is consistent with 
the impact on decision making ability for purchases of personal items and durable goods.  We do 
not, however, find that married households where the women are below the median in decision 
making ability increase expenditures on other non-female specific durables.  Likewise, we do not 
find any effect for men offered SEED, either in aggregate or for those above or below the median 
in household decision making power (Table 5, Panels C and D). 
 Self-Perception of Savings Behavior 
 In the follow-up survey, we included several questions about personal savings habits and 
attitudes.  In earlier research we found that time-inconsistent women were more likely than time-
consistent women to take up the SEED product, but that no such differential was found for men.8  
Here we examine whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects on savings attitudes and 
practices for men versus women and time-inconsistent versus time-consistent clients.  Table 6 
presents the results on four outcomes using an ordered probit specification.  For each outcome, 
the respondent was asked whether they strongly agree, agree, are neutral, disagree or strongly 
                                                 
8 Individuals defined as present-biased time-inconsistent when in hypothetical time preference questions in 
the survey, they revealed a higher discount rate for tradeoffs between now and 30 days than  tradeoffs 
between 6 months and 7 months. 
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disagree with a specific statement.  First, we ask about savings practices: (1) (Columns 1 and 2) 
“Although my income is low, I am a disciplined saver”, (2) (Columns 3 and 4) “I never save”, 
and (3) (Columns 5 and 6) “When I have a little cash, I spend it rather than save it.”  We find no 
aggregate effect, although we do find that time-inconsistent women who were offered the SEED 
account report being more likely to be a disciplined saver, less likely to never save, and less likely 
to report spending rather than saving extra cash.  This indicates that at least in their perception, 
the SEED account helped them overcome their self-control problem and led to improved savings 
practices (in earlier research, we do not find that the time-inconsistent women actually save more 
than the time-consistent women).   
 The final statement (Columns 7 and 8) is “I often find that I regret spending money.  I wish 
that when I had cash, I was better disciplined and saved it rather than spent it.”  Being assigned to 
treatment makes individuals more likely to report feeling regret over their spending and savings 
decisions.9  Note that only 28% of those offered SEED took up, and of those only about one-third 
regularly used the account.10  Hence it follows that although SEED helped 10% of the treatment 
group save more (and generate an overall positive intent-to-treat effect), the mere offer of the 
SEED account generated, on average, a feeling of remorse.  Perhaps those who did not take up 
and use felt remorse, and those who did take up and use did not feel remorse, but the average 
effect is an increase in remorse because of the relative size of these two groups.  Perhaps a second 
marketing would have been more successful than the first, if the first offer made individuals more 
aware of their inability to save as much as they would like. 
IV. Impact on Aggregate Savings or Debt Levels  
 Table 7 reports the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of random assignment to the treatment group 
across all asset and financial savings categories from the one-year follow-up survey.  Coefficients 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, agreeing with this statement is also correlated with being time-inconsistent when answering 
hypothetical time preference questions. 
10 Appendix Table 1 shows that about half of the individuals who have not withdrawn their funds did not 
due to because of a failure to use the account (the modal response is “could not save”, with 43 individuals). 
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on the treatment assignment can be interpreted as the average savings increase from being offered 
the commitment product.  By comparing the ITT impact on financial savings held at the Green 
Bank against the impact on savings held in assets and other informal and formal financial savings 
vehicles, we are able to test whether the savings impact of the commitment product reported in 
Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) represents increased savings or crowd-out of savings held in other 
vehicles.  
 We find that after 12 months treatment has no effect on the level of total assets (Column 4) 
and financial savings reported in the survey (Column 5), thus indicating that the increase in 
savings at the Green Bank is not due to crowd-out of savings from other savings vehicles into the 
commitment product.  However, we draw this conclusion with caution, as the estimated treatment 
impact for household savings is not precisely estimated.   
 We separate household savings into Green Bank total savings, Green Bank non-SEED 
savings, informal savings, and self-reported savings held at non-Green Bank financial institutions.  
Column 7 shows that the imprecision comes primarily from self-reported savings held at other 
financial institutions.11  We find no evidence of substitution across assets or savings held at home 
or in informal savings institutions (Column 6), and no substitution across accounts held within the 
Green Bank (Column 3), where crowd-out may be most likely to occur.  Finally, columns 8 and 9 
show that assignment to the commitment treatment group affected neither the probability of 
borrowing money, nor the size of debt held by the household.   
V. Long-Term Impact 
                                                 
11 The large standard error may be due to unsystematic measurement error in self-reported savings levels, 
or to wide heterogeneity in the degree of savings crowd-out due to the treatment.   We lack institutional 
data for savings held at non-Green Bank institutions to compare self-reported savings to actual savings 
levels.  However, for Green Bank savings, we have both institutional data and self-reported savings.  We 
regress true institutional savings on self-reported savings, and find that the residuals of the regression are 
not predicted by assignment to treatment group.  Results not shown, but available upon request.  Therefore, 
the imprecision in the estimated impact in column 7 is likely the outcome of unsystematic measurement 
error in self-reported savings. 
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 The impact did not sustain itself after the first year.  After 12 months the product led to an 
81% increase in savings (404 pesos, Table 7 Column 1) held at the bank, whereas after 32 months 
the increase is albeit positive, but only 33% (164 pesos, Table 7 Column 2) and no longer 
statistically significant.12  We posit four explanations for the lack of continued increase in savings 
balances.  First, use of the accounts was heterogeneous.  Many opened the accounts but never 
returned to continue depositing.  Others opened, deposited frequently, reached their goal, and 
then withdrew the funds.  Hence the puzzle is why the high-use individuals did not use the 
account again for further goals beyond the first year, since it seems to have worked initially for 
them.13  Perhaps the account worked but requires a proactive bank to help set the goal and 
establish the account (again) as a mechanism to help achieve that goal.  Only about one-quarter of 
the individuals that opened the accounts made deposits beyond the initial deposit, and only 26 
(13%) individuals used the funds for their originally stated goal (Appendix Table 1).  Thus about 
half of those who actively used the account reached their goal, withdrew their savings, and used 
the funds as originally intended. 
 Second, going back to the theory behind the preference for commitment, perhaps the present 
self wins in the long run—if the commitment can be undone in the future.  The SEED account 
caused a deviation from a low savings equilibrium, and gradually, individuals found ways to 
return back to the equilibrium they were in before.  This is similar to saying that habits are hard to 
change.  The Green Bank engaged in no activity to continually promote the SEED account.  If in 
each moment in time a client has a certain probability, less than one, of continuing to use the 
account, then clearly usage in aggregate will diminish over time.  Perhaps the product would have 
been more successful in the long run with continued marketing and promotion, by asking clients 
for an active decision to renew (Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick 2005), or through 
                                                 
12 We also find no results in a quartile regression. Results are not shown in the table but available upon 
request. 
13 We do not have access to withdrawal data in order to examine the impact on flow.  We only have access 
to balances. 
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interventions that automatically defaulted clients into depositing into the account.  If, on the other 
hand, the motivation was familial or spousal control, not self-control, a similar argument holds: 
over the long run, the other family members took other steps in order to exert back control of 
loose change and savings decisions.  There is some qualitative evidence that this type of pressure 
occurred for some of the women who were SEED clients.14  From these qualitative interviews 
with SEED clients, it appears that some women who desired the commitment feature of the SEED 
account had husbands who did not want to have any household funds tied up.  This is consistent 
with our earlier finding that time-inconsistent women were more likely to take up the product, but 
suggests that for these women commitment cannot always be maintained.  Similarly, although 
husbands report in surveys that they prefer to hand over the money to their wives to manage, in 
experiments with their spouses husbands instead kept money for themselves (Ashraf 2006). 
 Third, individuals may have learned from this experience that commitment does work for 
them but then found other commitment vehicles that are more beneficial (e.g., fixed deposits).  
Although we cannot rule this out in general, we do not find an increase in overall bank savings, 
which includes fixed deposits.  Fixed deposits are perhaps a good alternative commitment device 
since they provide a higher interest rate (although the minimum account opening balance may 
preclude most people from opening such an account).  Regardless, there are other vehicles outside 
of the Green Bank other than fixed deposits, so this test clearly is not dispositive of this 
explanation. 
 Fourth, impressionable individuals may have signed up for the SEED account believing it 
could help them (perhaps in part because they trust the Green Bank of Caraga).  In the short run, 
they saved more.  In the long run, they found it did not help them, and they stopped using it.  This 
suggests that the one-year positive impact on savings was actually sub-optimal, that individuals 
saved more than they ideally would.  Although insufficiently conclusive to rule out this 
                                                 
14 One woman who was not able to reach her goal complained that her “husband would not let her save; he 
said they needed to be able to get the money.”  Another woman said she “always fought with [her] husband 
about not being able to withdraw the money in an emergency.” 
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possibility, the result on regret discussed above suggests this is not the explanation: those offered 
SEED were more likely to report that they “regret spending, and wish they saved more.”  If after 
one year individuals found they saved more than they really wanted to, we should have seen a 
negative, not positive, impact on this question. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Microfinance has often been argued to improve the bargaining position of women by relaxing 
their credit constraints and giving them more power over household resources (Hashemi, Schuler 
and Riley 1996; Kabeer 1999).  Even when husbands appropriate their wives’ loans, as is 
common, microcredit is thought to empower women in household decision making processes 
(Mizan 1993).  Policymakers frequently cite these arguments as a key motivation for targeting 
microfinance and microsavings interventions to women.  On the other side, some have argued 
that microfinance usage and the subsequent need to repay (e.g., in order to protect her reputation 
amongst her peers) may subjugate women to the power of their spouses, hence potentially 
increasing domestic violence (Rahman 1999).  Evidence (albeit weak) points both ways, and 
naturally may depend largely on the region-specific economic and social setting.15  The effects of 
microcredit and, more generally, microfinance, which includes savings and/or insurance products, 
on female empowerment remain unclear, in large part because studies of it tend to suffer from a 
pronounced selection bias in the type of women who access microcredit (Pitt, Khandker and 
Cartwright 2003). 
 Using a randomized control methodology, we evaluate the impact of a commitment micro-
savings account.  First, we find that the commitment product positively impacts both household 
decision making power (i.e., the household is more likely to buy female-oriented durables) as 
well as self-perception of savings behavior (time-inconsistent females report being more 
disciplined savers).  Second, we find no evidence of crowd-out of other savings held at the same 
                                                 
15 See Chapter 7 of Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) for more discussion on this. 
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financial institution or elsewhere, although the latter is imprecisely measured.  Third, we find that 
the strong (81%) impact on savings that was observed after 12 months diminishes to 33% after 32 
months.   
 The diminished long-term impact opens several paths for further research.  We posited 
several reasons, some positive and some negative, why the impact was observed after one year 
but not after two and a half.  Would continued contact from the bank be sufficient to increase the 
long-term usage of the commitment savings account?  Did individuals learn to compensate in 
other facets of their life, hence negating the benefits of the commitment savings product?  Did 
individuals “learn” that commitment savings products do not work, or instead did individuals not 
get the reinforcement needed to change long term habits?  Experiments that continue to follow up 
with individuals to reinforce usage, and experiments that cross-sell (perhaps from other 
institutions) similar or competing commitment products could help separate these stories.   
 The impact on household decision making suggests another line of experimentation that may 
also shed insight into the diminished impact.  Perhaps the lack of long-term usage was a 
consequence of the shift in household decision making; it is possible that men became aware of 
the loss of power and adjusted in order to gain power back.  Examining the effect of credit and/or 
savings products that are deliberately shared versus those that are individualized would help 
answer whether the change in household decision making can be sustained.  Again, we could help 
answer these questions by following the study for a longer time period and by testing alternative 
methods of continued marketing and promotion of the product.   
 Through continued experimentation in this and other settings, we can learn more about how 
savings product design can help individuals fulfill their savings plans, whether savings product 
designs alter savings plans, and how these impacts on household decision making affect the 
efficacy of different savings products. The results here suggest that design features appeal to 
those with self-control, and have a positive impact on spousal control.  These are not 
contradictory findings, but rather point out that a simple design feature such as a restriction on 
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withdrawals can benefit both those in search of self control devices as well as those who desire to 
have more decision making power in the household. 
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All Control Treatment Marketing t-statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total 3,152 809 1,568 775
Completed baseline survey 1777 469 842 465
Completed follow-up survey 1,629 428 771 430
Baseline
Female, proportion 0.595 0.624 0.601 0.558 0.693
Married, proportion 0.773 0.806 0.767 0.753 0.526
Good health, baseline 0.532 0.519 0.555 0.502 0.052
Total savings at Green Bank, MIS 814.438 626.131 982.574 700.397 0.423
(116.501) (135.009) (228.033) (97.404)
Total household savings 7608.248 7304.373 7836.063 7502.232 0.760
(707.948) (1224.379) (949.195) (1679.325)
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Standard errors reported in the parentheses. 
All
Decision-making power 
below median in baseline
Decision-making power 
above median in baseline
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Female
Treatment 0.513** 0.779*** 0.252
(0.203) (0.282) (0.295)
Marketing 0.182 0.209 0.193
(0.248) (0.348) (0.346)
Household decision making power, baseline 0.268*** 0.239*** 0.233***
(0.028) (0.062) (0.067)
Constant 7.172*** 7.241*** 7.852***
(0.357) (0.587) (0.967)
Observations 642 330 312
R-squared 0.16 0.08 0.04
Panel B: Male
Treatment 0.007 0.179 -0.282
(0.266) (0.322) (0.451)
Marketing 0.150 0.440 -0.281
(0.288) (0.355) (0.487)
Household decision making power, baseline 0.198*** 0.227*** 0.114
(0.029) (0.058) (0.088)
Constant 7.138*** 6.747*** 8.572***
(0.349) (0.500) (1.272)
Observations 541 304 237
R-squared 0.09 0.06 0.01
Table 2: Impact on Household Decision Making Power
OLS
Sample Framework: Those whose spouses are living in the same house
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent Variable: Index of
household decision-making power on what to buy at the market, expensive purchases, giving assistance to family members, family
purchases, recreational use of the money, personal use of the money, number of children, schooling of children, and use of family planning.
The value for each item takes zero if the decision making is done by spouse, one if the decision making is done by the couple, and two if
decision making is done by the respondent, and the index is the sum of the value for all the items.
Dependent Variable:
Decision-
making power 
index
What to buy 
in market
Expensive 
purchases
Number of 
children
Family 
planning
Assist family 
members Personal use Recreation
Family 
purchase
Schooling for 
children
Specification: OLS
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
Ordered 
Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Female
Treatment 0.513** -0.003 0.203* 0.217* 0.023 0.143 0.013 0.112 0.174 0.162
(0.203) (0.117) (0.109) (0.114) (0.110) (0.113) (0.118) (0.107) (0.112) (0.125)
Marketing 0.182 -0.031 0.062 0.139 -0.114 0.033 -0.129 0.054 0.097 0.199
(0.248) (0.135) (0.129) (0.137) (0.131) (0.125) (0.137) (0.120) (0.138) (0.151)
Constant 7.172***
(0.357)
Observations 642 640 641 638 640 641 642 641 640 608
R-squared 0.16
Panel B: Females with household decision making power below median in baseline
Treatment 0.779*** -0.030 0.430*** 0.174 0.032 0.267* 0.276* 0.234 0.213 -0.065
(0.282) (0.160) (0.158) (0.162) (0.160) (0.157) (0.164) (0.150) (0.162) (0.199)
Marketing 0.209 -0.158 0.179 0.166 -0.187 0.279 -0.218 0.295* 0.143 -0.123
(0.348) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.184) (0.170) (0.179) (0.168) (0.187) (0.228)
Constant 7.241***
(0.587)
Observations 330 328 329 329 329 329 330 329 328 306
R-squared 0.08
Panel C: Females with household decision making power above median in baseline
Treatment 0.252 0.030 0.007 0.297* 0.013 0.038 -0.271 0.011 0.157 0.330*
(0.295) (0.173) (0.151) (0.160) (0.152) (0.163) (0.174) (0.153) (0.158) (0.169)
Marketing 0.193 0.162 -0.005 0.179 -0.040 -0.189 0.110 -0.189 0.097 0.473**
(0.346) (0.207) (0.189) (0.210) (0.190) (0.184) (0.220) (0.173) (0.202) (0.210)
Constant 7.852***
(0.967)
` Observations 312 312 312 309 311 312 312 312 312 302
R-squared 0.04
Table 3: Impact on household decision makring
Sample Framework: Women whose spouses are living in the same house
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All regressions in this table control for the initial household decision making 
power in the baseline.  The value for each item takes zero if the decision making is done by husband, one if the decision making is done by the couple, and two if decision making is 
done by wife. Column 1 reports the results from Table 5 of the impact on the index of decision making power, which takes the sum of all decision making items.
Binary Cost Binary Total number Cost Binary Total number Cost
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All 
Treatment 0.007 172.201 -0.019 0.009 48.293 -0.015 -0.006 -2,293.060
(0.033) (1,611.810) (0.032) (0.062) (312.882) (0.030) (0.042) (1,529.312)
Marketing 0.018 -1,393.116 -0.035 -0.017 144.558 -0.011 -0.024 -2,493.613
(0.038) (1,648.315) (0.036) (0.072) (475.376) (0.034) (0.047) (1,543.340)
Constant 7,615.907*** 0.495*** 1,997.997*** 0.305*** 6,095.462***
(1,299.894) (0.047) (242.252) (0.034) (1,344.654)
Observations 1181 1181 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Females
Treatment 0.026 2,758.632 -0.023 0.086 504.622 -0.002 0.050 -2,146.550
(0.045) (1,960.731) (0.043) (0.086) (433.285) (0.040) (0.052) (2,340.491)
Marketing 0.020 -1,133.261 -0.023 0.038 -56.553 0.029 0.043 -1,731.438
(0.053) (1,875.305) (0.051) (0.104) (508.971) (0.048) (0.058) (2,401.692)
Constant 6,761.989*** 0.489*** 1,947.878*** 0.261*** 6,230.154***
(1,289.453) (0.060) (297.011) (0.036) (2,032.658)
Observations 641 641 642 642 642 642 642 642
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Males
Treatment -0.016 -3,137.328 -0.012 -0.086 -519.682 -0.032 -0.080 -2,453.800
(0.051) (2,759.733) (0.049) (0.090) (456.142) (0.044) (0.071) (1,739.883)
Marketing 0.016 -2,010.130 -0.043 -0.071 315.665 -0.055 -0.107 -3,165.144*
(0.056) (2,942.709) (0.052) (0.103) (805.930) (0.047) (0.077) (1,764.869)
Constant 8,796.324*** 0.504*** 2,066.774*** 0.365*** 5,910.628***
(2,534.068) (0.077) (406.126) (0.062) (1,555.118)
Observations 540 540 541 541 541 541 541 541
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Female-oriented durables consist of washing
machines, sewing machines, electric iron, kitchen appliances, air conditioners, fans, and stoves. Other durables include vehicles, motorcycles, and
entertainment items (i.e. CD players, TV, and radio ).
Sample Framework: Those whose spouses are living in the same house
Table 4: Impact on consumer durables
House repair Female-oriented durables Other durables
Binary Cost Total number Cost Total number Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Females with household decision-making power below median in baseline
Treatment -0.033 857.273 0.214* 1,424.217** 0.023 -3,628.674
(0.062) (2,623.079) (0.110) (643.660) (0.072) (3,991.801)
Marketing 0.070 -2,725.065 0.115 521.969 0.066 -3,598.015
(0.073) (2,278.069) (0.139) (769.590) (0.086) (3,629.791)
Constant 6,683.516*** 0.385*** 1,545.604*** 0.264*** 7,772.527**
(2,015.289) (0.068) (353.341) (0.056) (3,436.760)
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 330
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Females with household decision-making power above median in baseline
Treatment 0.088 4,771.143 -0.037 -417.865 0.078 -763.065
(0.064) (2,959.613) (0.131) (562.495) (0.076) (2,505.552)
Marketing -0.039 900.238 -0.027 -652.920 0.015 118.330
(0.079) (3,211.015) (0.151) (600.110) (0.079) (3,363.112)
Constant 6,835.608*** 0.588*** 2,325.268*** 0.258*** 4,783.186**
(1,643.302) (0.097) (469.066) (0.047) (2,269.788)
Observations 311 311 312 312 312 312
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Males with household decision-making power below median in baseline
Treatment -0.017 -4,305.538 -0.075 -622.598 -0.073 -3,304.368
(0.065) (4,185.893) (0.119) (609.056) (0.096) (2,537.356)
Marketing -0.054 -3,920.212 -0.004 779.900 -0.194** -5,195.566**
(0.070) (4,500.404) (0.144) (1,274.342) (0.093) (2,394.219)
Constant 9,787.654** 0.469*** 2,031.728*** 0.379*** 6,652.543***
(3,988.753) (0.102) (556.478) (0.082) (2,334.842)
Observations 304 304 304 304 331 304
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Panel D: Males with household decision-making power above median in baseline
Treatment -0.016 -1,461.006 -0.107 -401.616 -0.085 -1,247.768
(0.080) (2,898.849) (0.136) (683.203) (0.105) (2,157.674)
Marketing 0.103 594.941 -0.162 -269.957 0.039 -486.051
(0.089) (3,073.887) (0.147) (867.416) (0.132) (2,477.748)
Constant 7,336.364*** 0.554*** 2,117.464*** 0.340*** 4,837.500***
(2,207.911) (0.116) (586.932) (0.093) (1,762.265)
Observations 236 236 237 237 210 237
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Female-oriented
durables consist of washing machines, sewing machines, electric iron, kitchen appliances, air conditioners, fans, and
stoves. Other durables include vehicles, motorcycles, and entertainment items (i.e. CD players, TV, and radio ).
Sample Framework: Those whose spouses are living in the same house
Table 5: Impact on consumer durables
House repair Female-Oriented Durables Other Durables
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: All
Treatment 0.025 -0.053 -0.104 -0.021 -0.095 -0.051 0.181*** 0.160**
(0.069) (0.080) (0.072) (0.083) (0.065) (0.077) (0.066) (0.078)
Marketing 0.057 0.073 -0.105 -0.064 -0.084 -0.105 0.070 0.102
(0.078) (0.091) (0.085) (0.098) (0.075) (0.090) (0.074) (0.088)
Time inconsistent, baseline -0.147 0.252* 0.109 0.043
(0.126) (0.138) (0.115) (0.120)
Treatment x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.300* -0.303* -0.163 0.082
(0.156) (0.165) (0.146) (0.149)
Marketing x Time inconsistent, baseline -0.050 -0.152 0.064 -0.102
(0.175) (0.195) (0.161) (0.161)
Observations 1629 1626 1629 1626 1629 1626 1629 1626
Panel B: Female
Treatment -0.021 -0.136 -0.049 0.069 -0.104 -0.005 0.130 0.153
(0.088) (0.103) (0.093) (0.107) (0.081) (0.097) (0.084) (0.101)
Marketing 0.176* 0.160 -0.148 -0.082 -0.214** -0.209* 0.118 0.184
(0.103) (0.123) (0.112) (0.132) (0.099) (0.123) (0.096) (0.118)
Time inconsistent, baseline -0.310** 0.308* 0.216 0.069
(0.158) (0.173) (0.136) (0.140)
Treatment x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.395** -0.389* -0.339* -0.072
(0.196) (0.209) (0.180) (0.180)
Marketing x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.040 -0.209 -0.018 -0.216
(0.225) (0.246) (0.199) (0.203)
Observations 970 968 970 968 970 968 970 968
Panel C: Male
Treatment 0.105 0.065 -0.199* -0.155 -0.084 -0.123 0.257** 0.170
(0.112) (0.128) (0.116) (0.133) (0.110) (0.126) (0.109) (0.121)
Marketing -0.066 -0.007 -0.077 -0.066 0.073 -0.000 0.010 -0.001
(0.118) (0.135) (0.131) (0.148) (0.118) (0.134) (0.117) (0.134)
Time inconsistent, baseline 0.128 0.196 -0.118 -0.014
(0.213) (0.222) (0.212) (0.241)
Treatment x Time inconsistent, baseline 0.133 -0.200 0.168 0.344
(0.263) (0.266) (0.255) (0.277)
Marketing x Time inconsistent, baseline -0.249 -0.080 0.285 0.066
(0.283) (0.312) (0.279) (0.288)
Observations 659 658 659 658 659 658 659 658
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variables are categorical, indicating how
strongly the respondent agrees to each statement. The variable equals one if the respondent strongly disagree, two if somewhat disagree, three if neutral, four if
somewhat agree, and five if strongly agree.
Table 6: Impact on Savings Attitude
Ordered Probit
I often regret spending, I 
wish I was more 
disciplined to save
Although my income is 
low, I'm a disciplined saver I never save
When I have a little cash, I 
spend it rather than save
Green Bank savings, 
Aug 04 (12 months)
Green Bank savings, 
Apr 06 
(32 months)
Non-SEED Green 
Bank savings, Aug 04 
(12 months)
Total Assets
(12 months)
Household total 
savings 
(12 months)
Household informal 
savings
(12 months)
Client's own formal 
savings 
(12 months)
Applied for a Loan 
(12 Months)
Total Debt 
(12 Months)
Data Source: Green Bank Green Bank Green Bank Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey
Sample frame: Completed Baseline Completed Baseline
Completed Baseline 
and Followup
Completed Baseline 
and Followup
Completed Baseline 
and Followup
Completed Baseline 
and Followup
Completed Baseline 
and Followup
Completed 
Baseline and 
Followup
Completed 
Baseline and 
Followup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment 404.320* 163.520 -36.162 4,994.054 563.659 246.797 568.355 0.098 1,511.81
(246.314) (289.632) (244.133) (8,906.509) (1,536.951) (274.744) (1,050.772) (0.026) (1,870.30)
Marketing 115.880 -145.718 -240.604 -7,928.332 573.717 -199.471 1,119.032 -0.0012 -402.22
(153.847) (196.025) (230.557) (8,654.795) (2,098.007) (156.060) (1,585.840) (0.030) (2,077.65)
Savings amount in baseline 0.748*** 0.318*** 0.662 0.245*** 0.027 0.147
(0.162) (0.095) (0.460) (0.076) (0.017) (0.092)
Constant 199.189 437.099** 241.828 62,353.800*** 5,857.283*** 591.756*** 3,133.255*** 0.748*** 15,815.89***
(162.943) (194.859) (344.842) (6,051.946) (1,264.199) (137.723) (752.259) (0.021) (1,413.86)
Observations 1777 1777 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
OLS
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column (4) is shown in order to reconcile the results in this table with the results reported in the earlier paper, Ashraf, Karlan and
Yin (2006). The precision is slightly higher, as this is the analysis on those who completed the baseline, unconditional on completing a follow-up survey as well. Column (6) also includes all individuals who completed the baseline in
order to provide the best comparison between the earlier reported 12 month results to the 32 month results.
Table 7: Impact on Savings
Those that did not withdraw: Reason for not withdrawing Frequency
Argued with spouse 1
Bad bank service/bank is far 3
Could not save 43
Damaged passbook 1
Destroyed ganansiya box 2
Did not need money 1
Did not like terms/low interest 3
Forgot about it 13
Inconvenience 8
Money stolen (7)/lost (1) 9
Never joined/not a member 5
Nobody collected 2
Not interested 1
Not to term 51
Rolled over 3
Total 149
Those that withdrew: Spent SEED Money on: Frequency
Fiesta 7
Children's schooling 6
Other/did not say 4
Add to capital of business/sari-sar 2
Birthday (own, child, grandchild, missus, etc) 5
Child is giving birth 1
Children's graduation 2
Christmas 3
Contruction of house/repair of kitchen 2
Everyday needs/necessities/groceries 4
Medical treatment 2
Reached time goal (3 months) 1
Refrigerator 1
Supplement mothers budget 2
Total 42
Spent money on original goal 26
Spent money on different goal from original 14
Appendix Table 1: Qualitative Feedback from SEED Account Holders
